Sunday, November 15, 2009
Normal blogging will resume...
... on Tuesday when I return from traveling. In the meantime, I have added a great blog by Daniel Martin Varisco, an old Yemen hand, and all around great guy. It is at Tabsir.net and is linked on the side.
Thursday, November 12, 2009
The Scariest Thing You Will Read Today
... is this brief from News Yemen that makes the claim that people in Shabwa are asking members of al-Qaeda to teach in their schools after the government has been unable to respond to their requests for more teachers. The brief says their patience ran out after a year.
Two things. First, I would want to be more sure of the sourcing before passing this off as fact: which tribes are asking for this?, to whom are they making the request to?, and who exactly does the brief mean by al-Qaeda members? There is an unhelpful tendency in Yemen to call nearly anyone an al-Qaeda member, which for me means someone who identifies primarily as an al-Qaeda supporter. And this, as Ghalib al-Zayadi has pointed out, does not always work in a Yemeni context.
But assuming that the brief is an accurate representation of what is going on then this is not good. I have made the statement a few times - including once to USA Today - that if al-Qaeda in Yemen ever turned itself into a positive organization, by which I mean an organization that could be for something instead of only against things, if it could provide services and be a force for good in people's daily lives in Yemen then its growth potential would be nearly unlimited. I have always added the caveat to that statement that there was no evidence to support the idea that AQAP was looking to go that way, and this is a pretty flimsy piece of evidence but it is still evidence. Whether it is a one-off item or a precursor is impossible for me to know, even with my magic 8-ball.
Two things. First, I would want to be more sure of the sourcing before passing this off as fact: which tribes are asking for this?, to whom are they making the request to?, and who exactly does the brief mean by al-Qaeda members? There is an unhelpful tendency in Yemen to call nearly anyone an al-Qaeda member, which for me means someone who identifies primarily as an al-Qaeda supporter. And this, as Ghalib al-Zayadi has pointed out, does not always work in a Yemeni context.
But assuming that the brief is an accurate representation of what is going on then this is not good. I have made the statement a few times - including once to USA Today - that if al-Qaeda in Yemen ever turned itself into a positive organization, by which I mean an organization that could be for something instead of only against things, if it could provide services and be a force for good in people's daily lives in Yemen then its growth potential would be nearly unlimited. I have always added the caveat to that statement that there was no evidence to support the idea that AQAP was looking to go that way, and this is a pretty flimsy piece of evidence but it is still evidence. Whether it is a one-off item or a precursor is impossible for me to know, even with my magic 8-ball.
The Abyan Fighting
As everyone's attention is rightly focused on the north and the Huthi conflict, the south is still hanging around. In Abyan clashes between an Islamist militia (not al-Qaeda) and security forces left, Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Haydari, a reporter for al-Wasat dead. (This report of al-Haydari's affiliation is being disputed by the News Yemen story below.)
The clashes that started late last night have continued through this morning and the government's representative in Khanfar claims that security forces have killed Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahman 'Abad, who is on its wanted list.
For anyone interested in the dynamics of 'Abyan I strongly recommend reading the News Yemen piece. This gives you a fairly good example, I believe, of the difficulties of keeping up with the news in Yemen. The story mentions a number of individuals that the government has arrested over the past little bit, some of whom are reportedly al-Qaeda members.
The piece states that one of these individuals is the leader of a local cell in Sami Dayan's organization as well as a leader of an al-Qaeda cell. I have my doubts about linking what is going on in Ja'ar directly to AQAP and, in fact, earlier this year Dayan went on the government's payroll under the direction of the VP, after Yemen realized that the old school leaders like al-Fadhli didn't have that much control over these younger guys, many of whom fought in Iraq.
The clashes that started late last night have continued through this morning and the government's representative in Khanfar claims that security forces have killed Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahman 'Abad, who is on its wanted list.
For anyone interested in the dynamics of 'Abyan I strongly recommend reading the News Yemen piece. This gives you a fairly good example, I believe, of the difficulties of keeping up with the news in Yemen. The story mentions a number of individuals that the government has arrested over the past little bit, some of whom are reportedly al-Qaeda members.
The piece states that one of these individuals is the leader of a local cell in Sami Dayan's organization as well as a leader of an al-Qaeda cell. I have my doubts about linking what is going on in Ja'ar directly to AQAP and, in fact, earlier this year Dayan went on the government's payroll under the direction of the VP, after Yemen realized that the old school leaders like al-Fadhli didn't have that much control over these younger guys, many of whom fought in Iraq.
The Humorous and the Dangerous
Oh, I love this quote by an unnamed (Is there any other kind?) Saudi adviser:
"The orders are not to go physically into Yemeni territory," he said. "We don't want to get bogged down there or inflame any local sensitivities, if there are any, against us."
Yeah, right? Local sensitivities in Sa'dah, c'mon those guys are, well, you know.
This also infuriated me. Nowhere in the piece that Jane Novak is referring to did Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rashad call "for Sunni men to join with Yemeni President Saleh's forces in battling the Shiite Houthi rebels." This is a gross misreading of the statement by someone who does not know Arabic. Not only is this misleading, but it complicates an already murky picture and is dangerous to boot. Relying on second-hand media reports to make a damning accusation like this is not at all responsible.
"The orders are not to go physically into Yemeni territory," he said. "We don't want to get bogged down there or inflame any local sensitivities, if there are any, against us."
Yeah, right? Local sensitivities in Sa'dah, c'mon those guys are, well, you know.
This also infuriated me. Nowhere in the piece that Jane Novak is referring to did Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rashad call "for Sunni men to join with Yemeni President Saleh's forces in battling the Shiite Houthi rebels." This is a gross misreading of the statement by someone who does not know Arabic. Not only is this misleading, but it complicates an already murky picture and is dangerous to boot. Relying on second-hand media reports to make a damning accusation like this is not at all responsible.
Huthis: The Sixth War
My own offerings on the Huthi conflict - or at least what I believe the war is all about - are now up in a piece over at the National.
Wednesday, November 11, 2009
The Saudization of AQAP
I finally carved out some time today to read over the transcript of Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman Sulayman al-Rashad's recent audio tape. This is the second anti-Shi'a screed from AQAP in a short time. I wrote about the first one, from Ibrahim al-Rubaysh, here.
It is significant, I believe, that both of these have been written or delivered by Saudi members of al-Qaeda. We know al-Rubaysh is a former Guantanamo detainee, but given what al-Rashad said I wonder if he spent time in Iraq. He makes a few references to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and spends a great deal of time talking about how the Sunni fighters (read: al-Qaeda) were the only ones to protect Sunnis from the Shi'a.
At least from my reading, the Iraq case seems to be one that is particularly close to his heart. He certainly doesn't know anything about the Huthis, claiming they are looking to take over Kuwait, Bahrain and al-Qatif. But not knowing anything about the Huthi conflict should never stop anyone from talking about it regardless of the language.
The main thing that I take away from al-Rashad's audio tape is the changing tone from AQAP. Why this focus on the Shi'a? This has never been a major part of the group's platform in Yemen, not when it was al-Qaeda in Yemen or al-Qaeda in the South of the Arabian Peninsula or any other incarnation. This is something recent and new and, I think, indicative of the growing Saudi influence in the organization.
As I pointed out in an earlier post today, Saudi's Mufti, Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz Al al-Shaykh has just given the religious cover to fight the Huthis, which in Saudi Arabia are described as Shi'a. So while al-Rubaysh's article and al-Rashad's statement fit very well within a Saudi context, they are both quite grating within the Yemeni context.
What exactly this means, or even whether this is indicative of a growing trend is difficult to say, but I do think this is something that will hurt the organization in Yemen and it is something, I continue to believe, that given the right direction from an appropriately intelligent individual can be exploited to weaken AQAP.
It is significant, I believe, that both of these have been written or delivered by Saudi members of al-Qaeda. We know al-Rubaysh is a former Guantanamo detainee, but given what al-Rashad said I wonder if he spent time in Iraq. He makes a few references to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and spends a great deal of time talking about how the Sunni fighters (read: al-Qaeda) were the only ones to protect Sunnis from the Shi'a.
At least from my reading, the Iraq case seems to be one that is particularly close to his heart. He certainly doesn't know anything about the Huthis, claiming they are looking to take over Kuwait, Bahrain and al-Qatif. But not knowing anything about the Huthi conflict should never stop anyone from talking about it regardless of the language.
The main thing that I take away from al-Rashad's audio tape is the changing tone from AQAP. Why this focus on the Shi'a? This has never been a major part of the group's platform in Yemen, not when it was al-Qaeda in Yemen or al-Qaeda in the South of the Arabian Peninsula or any other incarnation. This is something recent and new and, I think, indicative of the growing Saudi influence in the organization.
As I pointed out in an earlier post today, Saudi's Mufti, Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz Al al-Shaykh has just given the religious cover to fight the Huthis, which in Saudi Arabia are described as Shi'a. So while al-Rubaysh's article and al-Rashad's statement fit very well within a Saudi context, they are both quite grating within the Yemeni context.
What exactly this means, or even whether this is indicative of a growing trend is difficult to say, but I do think this is something that will hurt the organization in Yemen and it is something, I continue to believe, that given the right direction from an appropriately intelligent individual can be exploited to weaken AQAP.
Programming Note (Updated)
For those with any interest, I will be on al-Jazeera English this evening - sometime around 8 pm EST - discussing US-Yemeni relations.
Update: It turns out I had the time and subject wrong, I went on at 7:15 and talked about the Huthi conflict. Who knew?
Update: It turns out I had the time and subject wrong, I went on at 7:15 and talked about the Huthi conflict. Who knew?
Huthis and Iran and Jihad
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy's Simon Henderson has this piece on the Huthi conflict.
He suggests that the reason for the renewed conflict in August was that fighters of "the Houthi clan were blockading roads in the mountainous northwest of the country." I am not sure it is this simple - the sparring back and forth in the media between the President and 'Abd al-Malik over schools was important, as was another reason that I mention in an article I have coming out in the next couple of days.
He also makes the statement:
"Claims by the Sana government of Iranian involvement are bolstered by the slogans posted on one Houthi website: "Allah is great, death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, and victory for Islam." Such language suggests aims that far exceed a quest for local autonomy."
I think a more plausible explanation may be this, which I'm cribbing from something I wrote a while ago:
"The Huthis have often couched its rhetoric in anti-Western/anti-Israeli slogans. For instance, one of the most common slogans is “death to America, death to Israel.” But this rhetoric should not suggest that the group is actively anti-western, as it has not carried out any anti-western attacks, despite support for the Huthis within San‘a. Instead, it appears that the group is using popular frustration against US and Israeli policies in the Middle East to both engender local support and to implicitly criticize President Salih who is an ally of the US and by extension, according to the local logic, also an ally of Israel."
I am also curious as to where his estimate of 6,000 - 7,000 Huthi fighters comes from.
Scott Peterson of the Christian Science Monitor also weighs in with what I think is a good article assessing whether or not Iran has an active role in the conflict. Peterson relies strongly on quotes from Joost Hiltermann, whom I have always respected. I agree with most of what he says, but I think to suggest, as he does, that the Huthis didn't have any grievances in 2004 is to give them too little credit and is a gross misreading of the local history in Sa'dah.
"Despite some boilerplate anti-Western and anti-Israeli statements, the Houthis "don't have any serious ideology or set of grievances, for that matter," argues Hiltermann. "It was just a few angry guys who in 2004 stepped out of the political process and started a little rebellion."
Finally we have the chief Mufti of Saudi Arabia Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz Al al-Shaykh giving Saudi's military adventure in the south some legal cover by telling the soldiers they are on jihad.
There is much to discuss here, including the differences between Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz and his predecessor Shaykh bin Baz, but most of these I will save for my upcoming post on the Saudization of al-Qaeda.
He suggests that the reason for the renewed conflict in August was that fighters of "the Houthi clan were blockading roads in the mountainous northwest of the country." I am not sure it is this simple - the sparring back and forth in the media between the President and 'Abd al-Malik over schools was important, as was another reason that I mention in an article I have coming out in the next couple of days.
He also makes the statement:
"Claims by the Sana government of Iranian involvement are bolstered by the slogans posted on one Houthi website: "Allah is great, death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, and victory for Islam." Such language suggests aims that far exceed a quest for local autonomy."
I think a more plausible explanation may be this, which I'm cribbing from something I wrote a while ago:
"The Huthis have often couched its rhetoric in anti-Western/anti-Israeli slogans. For instance, one of the most common slogans is “death to America, death to Israel.” But this rhetoric should not suggest that the group is actively anti-western, as it has not carried out any anti-western attacks, despite support for the Huthis within San‘a. Instead, it appears that the group is using popular frustration against US and Israeli policies in the Middle East to both engender local support and to implicitly criticize President Salih who is an ally of the US and by extension, according to the local logic, also an ally of Israel."
I am also curious as to where his estimate of 6,000 - 7,000 Huthi fighters comes from.
Scott Peterson of the Christian Science Monitor also weighs in with what I think is a good article assessing whether or not Iran has an active role in the conflict. Peterson relies strongly on quotes from Joost Hiltermann, whom I have always respected. I agree with most of what he says, but I think to suggest, as he does, that the Huthis didn't have any grievances in 2004 is to give them too little credit and is a gross misreading of the local history in Sa'dah.
"Despite some boilerplate anti-Western and anti-Israeli statements, the Houthis "don't have any serious ideology or set of grievances, for that matter," argues Hiltermann. "It was just a few angry guys who in 2004 stepped out of the political process and started a little rebellion."
Finally we have the chief Mufti of Saudi Arabia Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz Al al-Shaykh giving Saudi's military adventure in the south some legal cover by telling the soldiers they are on jihad.
أضاف "أقول للجيش السعودي سيروا على طريق الحق، أنتم مجاهدون وحماة ثغور تقاتلون عن عقيدة وإيمان، دفاعاً عن أمن الحرمين، فأنتم في خير وجهاد في سبيل الله، فسيروا ثابتي الجأش، واستعينوا بالله عز وجل".
There is much to discuss here, including the differences between Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz and his predecessor Shaykh bin Baz, but most of these I will save for my upcoming post on the Saudization of al-Qaeda.
Self-Fulfulling Prophecy
I want to follow up on something that Greg hinted at yesterday (for those new to this blog, I used to write frequently, but got sidetracked by other things. This isn't just some guy hijacking the blog to talk). He mentioned that the constant drumbeat by the government regarding Iranian interference in the Huthi conflict is threatening to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. I think he is extremely accurate in this (not that his being accurate is surprising), and I believe that the recent Saudi incursion has the potential to force Iran's hand.
For a long time misguided commentators have ignored Yemen's history to paint this conflict as a proxy war between the region's two beasts, Iran and Saudi Arabia. This is understandable- great power meddling is much easier and a more gripping story than something as idiosyncratic as Yemen. Unfortunately, this was also: wrong. Or at least based on little-to-no evidence. The government made the choice to run with this, to encourage and promote it (the Iran side, anyway) because it helped to tie the battle into a larger regional picture, and put him on the same side as the US.
Things have a way of slipping out of control, though. Saudi Arabia entering Yemen has had the weird effect of rallying people against Saudi Arabia, but also might make Iran have to help out the Huthis, if only to save face. They can't, after all, let the Saudi's "win" the "proxy war" between them. Perception is reality. This is true everywhere; please don't read this as "in the Middle East, only force is blah blah blah".
I couldn't see a good reason for Saudi Arabia to intervene. I think it was near lunacy, as they don't really have anything to gain, and a lot to lose. And their mistake is compounded by the way it might force Iran's hand. This is a very good example of the consequences of doing something that seems good for the moment- talking about Persian adventurism is your country- without thinking down the road. Minus the specifics, that last sentence could be used for nearly everything in Yemen.
For a long time misguided commentators have ignored Yemen's history to paint this conflict as a proxy war between the region's two beasts, Iran and Saudi Arabia. This is understandable- great power meddling is much easier and a more gripping story than something as idiosyncratic as Yemen. Unfortunately, this was also: wrong. Or at least based on little-to-no evidence. The government made the choice to run with this, to encourage and promote it (the Iran side, anyway) because it helped to tie the battle into a larger regional picture, and put him on the same side as the US.
Things have a way of slipping out of control, though. Saudi Arabia entering Yemen has had the weird effect of rallying people against Saudi Arabia, but also might make Iran have to help out the Huthis, if only to save face. They can't, after all, let the Saudi's "win" the "proxy war" between them. Perception is reality. This is true everywhere; please don't read this as "in the Middle East, only force is blah blah blah".
I couldn't see a good reason for Saudi Arabia to intervene. I think it was near lunacy, as they don't really have anything to gain, and a lot to lose. And their mistake is compounded by the way it might force Iran's hand. This is a very good example of the consequences of doing something that seems good for the moment- talking about Persian adventurism is your country- without thinking down the road. Minus the specifics, that last sentence could be used for nearly everything in Yemen.
Tuesday, November 10, 2009
Be Careful What You Wish For
Long days of writing and scrambling to meet deadlines often leave little time or energy for writing's lesser cousin, blogging. And today is no different. Normally, I would prefer to be curled with a Richard Russo novel, but with all the news coming out of Yemen, the Waq al-waq team summoned our collective civic duty and fired up the computer one more time.
First, up is this report on Anwar al-'Awlaqi. The AP writes that Yemeni officials are looking for him. My guess is that he is either still in San'a or in Shabwa, not that knowing where he is makes him easy to detain.
Next up is the al-Qaeda news for the day. Apparently, something happened in Shabwa - I'm hearing that the car exploded on its way to its bombing target, but it is difficult to know for sure. News Yemen has a story here.
Yesterday, as some have noted in the comments, Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rashad, who is on the Saudi most-wanted list, released an audio statement yesterday. I have downloaded the tape and printed off the transcript but I haven't had time to read or listen to either, which limits my comments. However, it won't stop them.
Generally, if the content as reported by the AFP and others is correct, then this rising anti-Shi'a tone could signify that the Saudi members of AQAP are gaining more prominence and latitude within the organization. Again, as I have pointed out earlier, I think this is a chink that can be exploited, as I don't think this type of rhetoric will find a particularly receptive audience in Yemen. The audience in Saudi, I am willing to concede, is different.
Finally, we come to the Huthi news of the day. I have been writing about this conflict all day and have little intellectual energy to continue, so I will just add that in many ways what Yemen has been saying for the past several years with regards to Iran is now coming close to being a self-fulfilling prophecy. If I were the Yemeni government I would cease with the rhetoric and allegations, as it really is playing with fire.
First, up is this report on Anwar al-'Awlaqi. The AP writes that Yemeni officials are looking for him. My guess is that he is either still in San'a or in Shabwa, not that knowing where he is makes him easy to detain.
Next up is the al-Qaeda news for the day. Apparently, something happened in Shabwa - I'm hearing that the car exploded on its way to its bombing target, but it is difficult to know for sure. News Yemen has a story here.
Yesterday, as some have noted in the comments, Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rashad, who is on the Saudi most-wanted list, released an audio statement yesterday. I have downloaded the tape and printed off the transcript but I haven't had time to read or listen to either, which limits my comments. However, it won't stop them.
Generally, if the content as reported by the AFP and others is correct, then this rising anti-Shi'a tone could signify that the Saudi members of AQAP are gaining more prominence and latitude within the organization. Again, as I have pointed out earlier, I think this is a chink that can be exploited, as I don't think this type of rhetoric will find a particularly receptive audience in Yemen. The audience in Saudi, I am willing to concede, is different.
Finally, we come to the Huthi news of the day. I have been writing about this conflict all day and have little intellectual energy to continue, so I will just add that in many ways what Yemen has been saying for the past several years with regards to Iran is now coming close to being a self-fulfilling prophecy. If I were the Yemeni government I would cease with the rhetoric and allegations, as it really is playing with fire.
Monday, November 9, 2009
Black Magic
I have seen the Huthis accused with any number of things, but the charge of black magic is a new one.
Anwar al-Awlaki
Waq al-waq has a very narrow, if self-delineated, portfolio: Yemen. But sometimes Yemen has some strange links, as some of the Google searches that bring people to Waq al-waq indicate. (My favorite so far has been "tease video" from someone I am sure was not looking for al-Qaeda material but rather, shall we say, other types of stimulation). But today's news about the possible links between the Fort Hood shooter and Anwar al-Awlaki have put both on Waqal-waq's screen and since I have fielded a number of inquiries today I thought a post was in order. Although I am a bit reluctant to wade into these waters there are a couple of points that I thought needed clarification. Mostly, equating al-Awlaki with Yemen.
First, for some background I would recommend Michelle Shephard's piece in the Toronto Star.
As for al-Awlaki (I prefer the spelling al-'Awlaqi which more closely represents the Arabic - it is a qaf not a kaf) he was born in New Mexico and has US and Yemeni citizenship. His father was a member of the al-'Awlaq tribe from Shabwa. But his son, Anwar, is much more a product of the US than he is of Yemen. He spent most of his life in the US and it was only after September 11 that he moved to Yemen for good.
He was arrested - the reasons are varied, depending on the sources - and eventually released, although at one point his name showed up on a list of more than 100 prisoners that al-Qaeda in Yemen was seeking the release of from local prisons. In July of this year, he publicly praised al-Qaeda on his website following a clash between Yemeni security forces and al-Qaeda supporters in Marib. This understandably caused some friction between himself and the government.
In my opinion, he is not a major player within the Yemeni arena, but rather someone who uses his Yemeni background to bolster his credentials for non-Arabic speaking Muslims primarily in the US, Canada and Europe.
It is unclear exactly what his location is at the moment, but according to some local Arabic reports I have seen from late October the government is now looking for him, which would suggest that he is likely not at his home in San'a, or if there he is not receiving visitors as Michelle Shephard found out.
First, for some background I would recommend Michelle Shephard's piece in the Toronto Star.
As for al-Awlaki (I prefer the spelling al-'Awlaqi which more closely represents the Arabic - it is a qaf not a kaf) he was born in New Mexico and has US and Yemeni citizenship. His father was a member of the al-'Awlaq tribe from Shabwa. But his son, Anwar, is much more a product of the US than he is of Yemen. He spent most of his life in the US and it was only after September 11 that he moved to Yemen for good.
He was arrested - the reasons are varied, depending on the sources - and eventually released, although at one point his name showed up on a list of more than 100 prisoners that al-Qaeda in Yemen was seeking the release of from local prisons. In July of this year, he publicly praised al-Qaeda on his website following a clash between Yemeni security forces and al-Qaeda supporters in Marib. This understandably caused some friction between himself and the government.
In my opinion, he is not a major player within the Yemeni arena, but rather someone who uses his Yemeni background to bolster his credentials for non-Arabic speaking Muslims primarily in the US, Canada and Europe.
It is unclear exactly what his location is at the moment, but according to some local Arabic reports I have seen from late October the government is now looking for him, which would suggest that he is likely not at his home in San'a, or if there he is not receiving visitors as Michelle Shephard found out.
Monday Papers: or all the news that is fit to print
It was a busy weekend - both in Yemen and for the Waq al-waq team - but despite our busy schedules we are going to try to bring you a bit of a round-up.
First, there is this report from Reuters on the video that the Huthis have released of a captured Saudi prisoner. (I have decided not to link directly to these, but anyone with elementary Arabic skills and who is even slightly knowledgeable about the history of the conflict should have little trouble locating them). I just watched all four videos and I have to say that I disagree with Reuters statement that the man doesn't match his card.
"They also posted a picture of a military identity card carrying Omari's name but the photograph alongside it showed little resemblance to the man in the video."
But I have also been told by more than one reporter that I should go easier on those in the journalistic arts and so I won't say anything more.
Most news outlets, including this piece from the National's Mohammed al-Qadhi, seem to suggest that the clashes between Saudi Arabia and the Huthis are coming to a close. But I am much more cautious on this. What might look for the moment like a stop could, in the long term, be more of a pause.
The direct Saudi influence is going to significantly alter the complexion of the conflict. Now that Saudi Arabia has stepped across the line of direct confrontation I am not sure how it can get back and hiding behind "joint operations" or any other diplomatic coding is not going to fool anybody in Yemen. Direct Saudi involvement is going to prolong rather than shorten this war and it will give the Huthis many more supporters - even if only tacitly so.
There is also this interview with the Governor of Sa'dah, who claims there are no more than 600 Huthi fighters in Sa'dah. This statement as with his others is, well, interesting.
There will be much more on the Huthi conflict in the days ahead, as I will be publishing my own thoughts in a more polished format as well as a more distinguished forum.
But for the moment I will just say that the latest clashes between Saudi Arabia and the Huthis as well as the attempted assassination of Muhammad bin Nayif are, I believe, indicative, of what is to come from Yemen. That is, the view that some in Washington hold that Yemen will implode and that its problems can be contained within the borders of what we now know as Yemen is wishful and willful ignorance. As Yemen continues to dissolve the country is going to explode and its problems will spill over the border creating regional and international challenges.
Time Magazine has this piece on President Salih's inauguration of the new LNG plant. I will say I was quite impressed to read that Total hired mostly Yemenis and that it negotiated with separate tribes.
"The mounting hostility to Westerners is one reason Total opted to hire thousands of Yemenis to construct its new natural-gas facility, despite the fact that most needed extensive training. The company says Yemenis comprised about 70% of the 11,000 or so people who built the project. Total even negotiated separately with each of 22 tribes through which the pipeline travels in order to avoid angering locals."
But I was disappointed to see that the story ended with these two lines:
"Another attention-grabbing figure is 500. That's the number of Yemeni soldiers hired to guard the heavily fenced facility and pipeline. Because in a country as unstable as Yemen, any symbol of progress is also a constant target."
This implies that Yemenis hate modernization and all the trappings that westerners assume come with it and are eager to destroy anything new, nice or clean. I find this explanation ignorant at best, but mostly just insulting. Things like the LNG plant are targeted for many reason but none of them are because they are "symbols of progress." That is just sloppy thinking.
At the opening of the plant Salih did say that the war with the Huthis was just beginning, which is, or maybe more accurately, should be worrying news for everyone. The official US concern, expressed last week by Ian Kelly, seems to be having little impact. But today the US Embassy expressed concern over freedom of the press in Yemen. (Arabic here and English here)
At the same time the LNG plant is opening, the Jahm tribe - of which the Governor of Marib is a member - has cut off a road over frustrations - these are deep-rooted - regarding a land dispute in San'a.
First, there is this report from Reuters on the video that the Huthis have released of a captured Saudi prisoner. (I have decided not to link directly to these, but anyone with elementary Arabic skills and who is even slightly knowledgeable about the history of the conflict should have little trouble locating them). I just watched all four videos and I have to say that I disagree with Reuters statement that the man doesn't match his card.
"They also posted a picture of a military identity card carrying Omari's name but the photograph alongside it showed little resemblance to the man in the video."
But I have also been told by more than one reporter that I should go easier on those in the journalistic arts and so I won't say anything more.
Most news outlets, including this piece from the National's Mohammed al-Qadhi, seem to suggest that the clashes between Saudi Arabia and the Huthis are coming to a close. But I am much more cautious on this. What might look for the moment like a stop could, in the long term, be more of a pause.
The direct Saudi influence is going to significantly alter the complexion of the conflict. Now that Saudi Arabia has stepped across the line of direct confrontation I am not sure how it can get back and hiding behind "joint operations" or any other diplomatic coding is not going to fool anybody in Yemen. Direct Saudi involvement is going to prolong rather than shorten this war and it will give the Huthis many more supporters - even if only tacitly so.
There is also this interview with the Governor of Sa'dah, who claims there are no more than 600 Huthi fighters in Sa'dah. This statement as with his others is, well, interesting.
There will be much more on the Huthi conflict in the days ahead, as I will be publishing my own thoughts in a more polished format as well as a more distinguished forum.
But for the moment I will just say that the latest clashes between Saudi Arabia and the Huthis as well as the attempted assassination of Muhammad bin Nayif are, I believe, indicative, of what is to come from Yemen. That is, the view that some in Washington hold that Yemen will implode and that its problems can be contained within the borders of what we now know as Yemen is wishful and willful ignorance. As Yemen continues to dissolve the country is going to explode and its problems will spill over the border creating regional and international challenges.
Time Magazine has this piece on President Salih's inauguration of the new LNG plant. I will say I was quite impressed to read that Total hired mostly Yemenis and that it negotiated with separate tribes.
"The mounting hostility to Westerners is one reason Total opted to hire thousands of Yemenis to construct its new natural-gas facility, despite the fact that most needed extensive training. The company says Yemenis comprised about 70% of the 11,000 or so people who built the project. Total even negotiated separately with each of 22 tribes through which the pipeline travels in order to avoid angering locals."
But I was disappointed to see that the story ended with these two lines:
"Another attention-grabbing figure is 500. That's the number of Yemeni soldiers hired to guard the heavily fenced facility and pipeline. Because in a country as unstable as Yemen, any symbol of progress is also a constant target."
This implies that Yemenis hate modernization and all the trappings that westerners assume come with it and are eager to destroy anything new, nice or clean. I find this explanation ignorant at best, but mostly just insulting. Things like the LNG plant are targeted for many reason but none of them are because they are "symbols of progress." That is just sloppy thinking.
At the opening of the plant Salih did say that the war with the Huthis was just beginning, which is, or maybe more accurately, should be worrying news for everyone. The official US concern, expressed last week by Ian Kelly, seems to be having little impact. But today the US Embassy expressed concern over freedom of the press in Yemen. (Arabic here and English here)
At the same time the LNG plant is opening, the Jahm tribe - of which the Governor of Marib is a member - has cut off a road over frustrations - these are deep-rooted - regarding a land dispute in San'a.
Friday, November 6, 2009
The Big Question for Saudi Arabia
Two new You Tube videos supposedly show the Saudi Air Force carrying out bombing runs. Part one is here and part two is here.
For me the big question is how does this end for Saudi Arabia? The confused reports coming out of Riyadh would seem to suggest that indeed Saudi has struck targets inside of Yemen. So what happens when Huthi or tribal fighters retaliate by killing more Saudi troops, do the Saudis then retaliate and strike back again at the Huthis this time deeper into Yemen?
I get the impression that the idea of wading into the muck that is the northern revolt is not something that has been well thought out in Saudi Arabia, which also gets at something else I have been asking for a while: who exactly is running Saudi Arabia's Yemen portfolio? It certainly is not Sultan. And although Muhammad bin Nayif clearly has charge of the AQ section, Saudi Arabia is not the US and is not only focused on al-Qaeda. It has a multi-faceted relationship with Yemen.
My impression is that no one individual is in charge, but that different individuals are taking turns steering the thing with little idea of where they are going besides bouncing from crisis to crisis trying to keep the crazy Yemenis and their problems from flooding across the border.
Now there are early reports of Huthi fighters capturing Saudi soldiers, so how will Saudi respond? By attempting to put more pressure on the Huthis by taking their own captives? Is Saudi confident enough in its ability to identify who is fighting that it is certain it will only capture Huthi fighters and not, say, members of another tribe with branches in Saudi Arabia? The conflict in Sa'dah is a bit like quicksand, the more you move the deeper you get.
For me the big question is how does this end for Saudi Arabia? The confused reports coming out of Riyadh would seem to suggest that indeed Saudi has struck targets inside of Yemen. So what happens when Huthi or tribal fighters retaliate by killing more Saudi troops, do the Saudis then retaliate and strike back again at the Huthis this time deeper into Yemen?
I get the impression that the idea of wading into the muck that is the northern revolt is not something that has been well thought out in Saudi Arabia, which also gets at something else I have been asking for a while: who exactly is running Saudi Arabia's Yemen portfolio? It certainly is not Sultan. And although Muhammad bin Nayif clearly has charge of the AQ section, Saudi Arabia is not the US and is not only focused on al-Qaeda. It has a multi-faceted relationship with Yemen.
My impression is that no one individual is in charge, but that different individuals are taking turns steering the thing with little idea of where they are going besides bouncing from crisis to crisis trying to keep the crazy Yemenis and their problems from flooding across the border.
Now there are early reports of Huthi fighters capturing Saudi soldiers, so how will Saudi respond? By attempting to put more pressure on the Huthis by taking their own captives? Is Saudi confident enough in its ability to identify who is fighting that it is certain it will only capture Huthi fighters and not, say, members of another tribe with branches in Saudi Arabia? The conflict in Sa'dah is a bit like quicksand, the more you move the deeper you get.
Thursday, November 5, 2009
Jabal Dukhan
News Yemen helps to explain the strategic importance of Jabal Dukhan and gives a bit more information, which is helpful since the mountain is not in my mu'ajim al-buldan.
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